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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

IX.

REMEDIES

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley: Status Quo

Injunctions Under the FederalArbitration Act
Arbitration is a contractual proceeding in which parties agree to submit
disputes to one or more persons for a quick, inexpensive, and binding
determination.' Under the common law, either party to a private arbitration
agreement could revoke the agreement at any time before the arbitrators

rendered an award. 2 The courts, fearing erosion of their jurisdiction, refused
to enforce agreements to arbitrate.3 By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act
(Arbitration Act), 4 Congress made private agreements to arbitrate enforceable
in federal courts.' Congress enacted the Arbitration Act to avoid expensive

1. See Alderman v. Alderman, 296 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (arbitration is
contractual proceeding by which parties voluntarily select arbitrators to obtain speedy, binding
and inexpensive resolution); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) (arbitration
agreements are matters of contract and Arbitration Act will make agreements to arbitrate
enforceable like other contracts); Carlston, Theory of the Arbitration Process, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 631, 631 (1952) (Carlston defines arbitration as process in which parties agree
to refer controversies to one or more persons for final resolution).
2. See Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1957) (courts
historically disliked compelled arbitration, and either party to arbitration agreement could
withdraw from arbitration any time prior to award) (citing Boston & L.R. Corp. v. Nashua &
L.R. Corp., 139 Mass. 463, -,
31 N.E. 751, 752 (1885)).
3. See H.R. Ratp. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 2 (1924). The English courts refused
to enforce arbitration agreements because the English courts feared that arbitration tribunals
did not have the ability to give or enforce proper remedies and that the arbitration tribunals
infringed on the English courts' jurisdiction to hear disputes between parties. Id. The English
courts' fear became engrained in American common law. Id.; see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1973). In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the United States Supreme
Court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act reversed centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11.
4. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
5. See Federal Arbitration Act § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 of the Arbitration
Act states in pertinent part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved
in such suit or proceedirig is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently held in Southland Corp. v. Keating
that § 2 of the Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law to be applied equally in state and
federal courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Although the Fourth Circuit
in Iferrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley involves the application of § 3 of the
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6
litigation and costly delays in reaching a final resolution of contract disputes.
To prevent one party from pursuing costly litigation in addition to arbitration, section 3 of the Arbitration Act states that upon application of either

party, a federal court must stay the trial while the parties proceed to
arbitration. 7 Sections 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Act establish four prereq-

uisites, which a party must satisfy to obtain a stay of the trial., The
prerequisites for a stay of the trial consist of a contract involving a transaction
in interstate commerce, a written provision to arbitrate disputes in the
contract, a dispute that is arbitrable under the terms of the contract, and an
applicant for the stay of the trial who has not acted inconsistently with the
applicant's right to arbitrate. 9 Federal circuit courts of appeal disagree
Arbitration Act to federal district courts, the issues discussed in Bradley involving the Arbitration
Act appear to be applicable to state courts. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
McCollom, 105 S. Ct. 811, 811-12 (1985). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
McCollom, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to a petitioner whose case was
on appeal from the Texas state courts. Id. In McCollum, McCollum signed an account
agreement, which provided that McCollum would not take client lists from Merrill Lynch nor
solicit Merrill Lynch clients for one year after McCollum's termination of employment. Id. at
812. Furthermore, McCollum agreed to settle all disputes arising out of McCollum's employment
through arbitration. Id. McCollum left Merrill Lynch to work with a competitor of Merrill
Lynch, and Merrill Lynch sued for damages and injunctive relief in the District Court for
Harris County, Texas, alleging that McCollum had violated the account agreement by taking
Merrill Lynch's client list and soliciting Merrill Lynch clients. Id. The District Court for Harris
County denied injunctive relief, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme
Court denied Merrill Lynch's petition for a Writ of Error. Id. Although the Supreme Court of
the United States denied certiorari, Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented from
the denial of certiorari. Id. Justice White noted that the issue presented in the McCollum case
of whether § 3 of the Arbitration Act bars a court from issuing a status quo injunction in
disputes subject to arbitration is a divisive issue in both state and federal courts. Id. at 812.
Justice White also noted that although the Supreme Court in Southland reserved the question
of whether § 3 of the Arbitration Act should be applied by the state courts, the state courts
appear to accept that they should apply § 3. Id. at 812 n.2. See Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. at 16 n.10 (Supreme Court noted that in holding Arbitration Act preempts any state
law that removes power to enforce arbitration agreements, Supreme Court was not holding that
§ 3 applied to state court proceedings).
6. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)
(Congress' intent in Arbitration Act was to move parties into arbitration as quickly as possible);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (once parties agreed
to arbitrate disputes, Congress intended that arbitration should be expeditious, without delay
or expense in courts); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1924) (intent of Arbitration
Act is to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal courts); S. REP. No. 536, 68th
Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1924) (Congress recognized growing public desire to avoid rising cost and
delay of litigation); 2569 CONG. REc. 3004 (1925) (statement of Rep. Graham) (result of
Arbitration Act will be to enforce agreements to arbitrate); 2569 CONG. REc. 11081 (1924)
(statement of Rep. Dyer) (Arbitration Act would eliminate much expensive litigation).
7. See Federal Arbitration Act § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982); supra note 5 and accompanying
text (quoting § 3 of the Arbitration Act).
8. See infra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing requirements that party applying for
stay of trial must meet under Arbitration Act).
9. Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Federal Arbitration Act § 3, 9
U.S.C. § 3 (1982). See C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships,
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concerning whether the language in the Arbitration Act requiring a court to
stay the trial bars a federal district court from entering a preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. 0 The Eighth and
Tenth Circuits have held that section 3 of the Arbitration Act prohibits
federal district courts from entering preliminary injunctions pending arbitration." The Second and Seventh Circuits have held that when the parties have
agreed to maintain the status quo in the arbitration agreement, section 3
2
does not bar a federal district court from entering a status quo injunction.'
The Fourth Circuit in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bradley'3 recently addressed the question of whether a district court can enter
a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration when
the parties to the arbitration agreement did not agree specifically to maintain
4
the status quo pending arbitration.
In Bradley, Merrill Lynch hired the defendant, Kenneth Dale Bradley,
to serve as an account executive.15 In consideration for his employment,
Bradley signed an account executive agreement in which he agreed that, upon
termination of his employment with Merrill Lynch, he would not solicit for
one year any clients he had served while employed at Merrill Lynch.' 6 The
375 F. Supp. 446, 450 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (discussing four prerequisites in §§ 2 and 3 of
Arbitration Act that party applying for stay of trial under Arbitration Act must satisfy); N &
D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Industr. Inc., C.A., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1976) (defining
"default in proceeding with arbitration" in § 3 of Arbitration Act as actively participating in
lawsuit or any action inconsistent with right to arbitrate); supra note 5 and accompanying text
(quoting § 3 of Arbitration Act); see also Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
of an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising
out of such a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
10. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit and Tenth Circuit
cases holding that § 3 of Arbitration Act bars federal district courts from granting injunctive
relief). But see infra notes 34, 69 and accompanying text (discussing Second and Seventh Circuit
cases holding that courts can enter status quo injunctions in disputes subject to § 3's command
that courts must stay trial pending arbitration). See supra note 5 and accompanying text (quoting
§ 3 of the Arbitration Act).
11. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth and Tenth Circuit's
holdings concerning whether federal district courts can grant preliminary injunctions in cases
subject to Arbitration Act).
12. See infra notes 34, 69 and accompanying text (discussing Second and Seventh Circuit's
holdings concerning whether federal district courts can grant preliminary injunctions in cases
subject to to Arbitration Act).
13. 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 1052.
15. Id. at 1050. In Bradley, Merrill Lynch hired Bradley on December 16, 1981, to serve
as an account executive in its office in Newport News, Virginia. Id.
16. Id. In Bradley, Bradley signed an account executive agreement not to compete with
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agreement provided that Merrill Lynch and Bradley would settle by arbitration any controversy arising out of Bradley's employment or termination of
employment. 17 The agreement, however, did not include a provision for
maintaining the status quo pending arbitration in the event of a breach of
the agreement.' 8 On Friday, July 20, 1984, Bradley submitted his resignation

to Merrill Lynch and informed Merrill Lynch that he had accepted a position
with Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.' 9 Shortly thereafter, Bradley solicited
many of his former Merrill Lynch customers. 20 Merrill Lynch filed suit
against Bradley in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and
conspiracy to injure trade in violation of Virginia law. 2' In addition, Merrill
Lynch moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. 22 The district court granted
Merrill Lynch's motion and enjoined Bradley from soliciting or serving any
of his former clients, ordered expedited arbitration, and denied Bradley's
motion to stay the injunction. 23 Appealing to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Bradley asserted that the district court had
abused its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction. 24 Because the

parties had agreed that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the
Arbitration Act, 25 the principal issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether
section 3 of the Act precludes a federal district court from granting injunctive
26
relief to maintain the status quo pending arbitration.

The Bradley court first examined the language of section 3, which
provides that if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute, then a court
Merrill Lynch. Id. The agreement provided that all the names and addresses of Bradley's clients
were the property of Merrill Lynch, and that upon termination of his employment, Bradley
would not remove the client lists or any copies of the lists from Merrill Lynch's offices. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1051.

21. See id. In Bradley, Merrill Lynch alleged that certain executives in Prudential-Bache's
Virginia Beach office conspired to injure Merrill Lynch's business. Id. Bradley was the third
Merrill Lynch account executive in ten months to leave the Merrill Lynch office in Hampton
Roads, Virginia, to begin work for Prudential-Bache's Virginia Beach office, and immediately
to breach the agreement not to compete with Merrill Lynch. Id.; see VA. CODE § 18.2-499
(Supp. 1985). Virginia law declares that a conspiracy by two or more persons to injure another
person's business is unlawful. VA. CODE 18.2-499 (Supp. 1985).
22. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1050.
23. See id. at 1050-51.
24. Id. In Bradley, Bradley argued that because the dispute concerning Bradley's breach
of contract was subject to mandatory arbitration, § 3 of the Arbitration Act proscribed any
further action by the district court. Id.; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (quoting § 3
of Arbitration Act).
25. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1051. In addition to agreeing that the dispute in Bradley was
subject to arbitration, Merrill Lynch and Bradley agreed that Bradley was not in default in
proceeding with arbitration. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing prerequisites
for stay of trial pending outcome of arbitration).
26. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1051.
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must stay the trial. 27 After noting that the language of the statute specifically
did not preclude preliminary injunctions, 28 the Fourth Circuit noted that if
Congress intended to divest the federal district courts of equitable remedies,
Congress knew how to draft a statute that would limit the federal district
courts' equitable powers.2 9 Section 3 of the Arbitration Act, however, requires
a court to stay the "trial." 30 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Arbitration
Act's legislative history does not support an interpretation of the term "trial"
beyond its ordinary meaning-a final resolution of the controversy on the
merits of the case. 3' The Bradley court concluded that Congress would not
have stripped the federal courts of their equitable powers without greater
32
discussion of the statute's intended impact on the judiciary.
The Bradley court found support for the conclusion that the language
in section 3 does not deprive district courts of the power to enter injunctions
in Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club.33 In Erving, the Second Circuit

affirmed an injunction prohibiting a professional basketball player from
joining another team.3 4 Although the parties had entered a written agreement
27. Id.; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (quoting § 3 of Arbitration Act).
28. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052 (noting that § 3 of Arbitration Act does not expressly
prohibit federal courts from granting injunctions).
29. Id.; see infra note 80 and accompanying text (examples of Congress addressing
equitable powers of federal judiciary).
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (quoting § 3 of Arbitration Act).
31. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052. See H.R. RaP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)
(House Report No. 96 does not indicate that courts should interpret term "trial" beyond its
ordinary meaning); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1924) (Senate Report No. 536
gives no indication that term "trial" should be interpreted beyond its ordinary meaning).
32. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052. The Fourth Circuit in Bradley noted that if Congress
intended to deprive the federal judiciary of all the judiciary's equitable powers, Congress would
have explained comprehensively the statute's intended effect. Id. The Bradley court pointed out
that the Eighth Circuit, which held in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey
that § 3 of the Arbitration Act precludes a federal district court from granting a preliminary
injunction to maintain the status quo in disputes subject to mandatory arbitration, never
examined the language in § 3 of the Arbitration Act. Id. at 1052 n.4; infra note 70 and
accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's holding in Hovey).
33. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052-53; see Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 46&
F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that parties have extra-contraciual right to status quo
injunction); infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in
Erving).
34. See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, Julius Erving signed a contract during his junior
year at the University of Massachusetts to play basketball with the Virginia Squires Basketball
Club. Id. at 1066. After his first year with the Virginia Squires, the Atlanta Hawks offered
Erving a contract for approximately $1,500,000. Id. Erving entered into the contract with the
Atlanta Hawks and brought suit against the Virginia Squires to rescind the contract, alleging
that concealment and false misrepresentations by the Virginia Squires induced him to sign the
Virginia Squires' contract. Id. Virginia Squires counterclaimed, seeking injunctive protection to
prevent Erving from playing with the Atlanta Hawks and seeking enforcement of Virginia
Squires' right to arbitrate under the contract. Id. The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York entered an order in favor of Virginia Squires, granting a stay of the trial and an
injunction pending arbitration. Id. at 1064. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 43:431

explicitly authorizing injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pending

arbitration, the Erving court declared that the agreement only stated the
parties' existing right to obtain a status quo injunction pending arbitration.35
The Fourth Circuit in Bradley relied on the statement by the Second Circuit
that the agreement to maintain the status quo was merely a declaration of
the parties' existing rights to obtain a status quo injunction. 6 Consequently,
the Bradley court found that the Second Circuit's decision in Erving supports

the proposition that a specific agreement to maintain the status quo is not
court to grant a status quo injunction under the
necessary for a district
7
Arbitration Act.

The Fourth Circuit had faced a similar issue under the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 8 of whether injunctive relief is proper when the parties to a
labor dispute have agreed to arbitrate.3 9 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, unlike

the Arbitration Act, contains specific language prohibiting injunctions. 40 The

court's orders. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the parties had an explicit contractual
provision to maintain the status quo pending arbitration, but found that the provision to
maintain the status quo merely stated the parties' existing right to preserve the status quo. Id.
at 1067.
35. See Erving, 468 F.2d at 1067.
36. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1052-53; see supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing
Erving court's statement that explicit agreement between parties to maintain status quo merely
stated existing legal rights to status quo injunction). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 n.10 (8th Cir. 1984). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, the court refused to acknowledge a district court's independent
right to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. Id. The Eighth Circuit distinguished the
arbitration agreement in the Erving case from the arbitration agreement in the Hovey case because
in Erving the parties explicitly had agreed to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. Id.
Erving's contract had stipulated that Erving's services were exceptional and unique and that the
loss of Erving's services would cause irreparable damage to the Virginia Squires. Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972). As a result, the contract in
Erving explicitly had provided for an injunction to maintain the status quo pending completion
of arbitration). Id.
37. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053.
38. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1-1801 (1982).
39. See Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115,
117 (4th Cir. 1976) (involving question of whether district court abused its discretion by granting
preliminary injunction preserving status quo pending arbitration of dispute under labor agreement); Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers
Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1338 (4th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929
(1979); infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Lever Bros. and Akers Motor Lines
cases).
40. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act provides in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating in or interested in such dispute
... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment.
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Bradley court maintained, however, that several cases involving the more
explicit anti-injunctive language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act lent support

for the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the Arbitration Act's command that
a court must stay a trial pending the outcome of arbitration does not preclude
injunctive relief. 4' In two Fourth Circuit cases, Lever Brothers Co. v.
InternationalChemical Workers Union, Local 21742 and Drivers, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor

Lines, Inc.,4 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district courts' orders granting
status quo injunctions pending the arbitration of labor disputes." Both cases
involved situations in which the employers were permanently relocating or
liquidating an existing facility. 45 The unions filed suit seeking injunctions,
claiming that the companies' respective decisions to relocate or liquidate
existing facilities turned on arbitrable issues under their collective bargaining

41. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053; see infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth
Circuit decisions addressing whether Norris-LaGuardia Act's language prohibiting injunctions
includes injunctions to maintain status quo pending arbitration).
42. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
43. 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979).
44. See Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120
(4th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court's order issuing preliminary injunction preserving status
quo until completion of pending arbitration involving dispute under labor agreement); Drivers,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers Motor Lines,
Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); infranote 45 and accompanying text (discussing
the Fourth Circuit's holdings in Lever Bros. and Akers Motor Lines).
45. See Akers Motor Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341; Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 117-18. In Lever
Bros. Co. v. InternationalChem. Workers Union, Local 217, the district court in Lever Brothershad
issued an injunction preventing the Lever Brothers Company (Company) from permanently
transferring its Baltimore, Maryland plant to Hammond, Indiana, until the International
Chemical Workers Union (Union) had arbitrated the Union's grievances. Id. In Lever Brothers,
the Company and Union had entered into a collective bargaining agreement regarding the
employees at the Company's Baltimore plant. Id. In October 1975 the Company advised the
Union that the Company was closing the Baltimore plant and moving production to the
Company's Hammond, Indiana facility. Id. The Union filed a grievance, claiming that the
Company's activities constituted "contracting out" rather than "elimination" of work under
the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The collective bargaining agreement required the
arbitration of all grievances. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland properly determined that the disagreement was a grievance subject
to arbitration. Id. Affirming the district court's decision to grant an injunction, the Fourth
Circuit held that an injunction is appropriate to preserve the status quo pending arbitration
when in the absence of an injunction, the arbitration becomes a "hollow formality." Id.
In Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers
Motor Lines, Inc., the Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union
No. 71 (Union) was faced with the similar prospect of their employer, Akers Motor Lines
(Employer), liquidating the Employer's business. Akers Motor Lines, 582 F.2d at 1338-39. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina's action to grant injunctive relief to prevent the Employer from continuing to liquidate
the Employer's assets pending resolution of the arbitration. Id. The Akers Motor Lines court
reasoned that if the Employer continued to liquidate the Employer's assets, the Union's arbitral
victory would be meaningless for the Union because the Employer would not have jobs available
for reassignment to Union workers. Id.
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agreements. 46 Accordingly, the unions argued that without an injunction,
arbitration would be a futile endeavor because the companies would relocate

or liquidate before the arbitration. 47 The Fourth Circuit held in both cases
that despite the explicit anti-injunctive language of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, a district court has the discretion to enter an injunction when without
an injunction, the arbitral process would become a "hollow formality"
wholly incapable of returning the parties to the status quo ante.41 In both
Lever Brothers"9 and Akers Motor Lines,50 the Fourth Circuit relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 51 in which the Supreme Court held that in cases involving

parties who have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, a narrow reading of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunctive language to prohibit all injunctions
is contrary to the legislative policy of promoting the arbitration of labor
52

disputes.
Adopting the hollow formality standard established under the NorrisLaGuardia Act in Lever Brothersand Akers Motor Lines, the Fourth Circuit
in Bradley stated that the hollow formality test represents the best approach
to determine whether a district court has the power to grant a preliminary
injunction under the Arbitration Act. 5 3 The Fourth Circuit noted that the
hollow formality test promotes the congressional policy favoring arbitration
by insuring that the arbitral process will continue to be an alternative method
for resolving disputes.5 4 The Bradley court doubted that Congress intended
to deprive federal courts of equitable remedies to prevent one party from
irreparably harming the other party.5 5 The Bradley court determined that

46. Akers Motors Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341; Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 118-19.
47. Akers Motors Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341; Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 118-19.
48. Akers Motors Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341; Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 123.
49. Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 123.
50. Akers Motor Lines, 582 F.2d at 1341.
51. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
52. Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970); see
infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's holding in Boys
Markets).
53. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053-54. The Fourth Circuit in Bradley stated that the hollow
formality standard, which allows a district court to grant a status quo injunction when necessary
to prevent the arbitration from becoming a hollow formality, represented a sound approach for
determining when a district court can properly grant a preliminary injunction under the
Arbitration Act. Id. The Fourth Circuit defined hollow formality as a situation in which an
arbitration would be unable to return the parties to the status quo ante. Id. Under the hollow
formality standard courts can ensure that arbitration will remain a meaningful process for
dispute resolution. Id.; supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
holding in Lever Brothers and Akers Motor Lines).
54. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional policy of Arbitration Act).
55. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054. The Bradley court noted that when account executives
breach nonsolicitation agreements, absent immediate injunctive enforcement, arbitration agreements are ineffective because the damage is complete and irreparable before arbitration begins.
Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act).
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arbitration is a hollow formality when arbitration would be unable to return

the parties to the status quo ante.5 6 The Fourth Circuit held that when an
arbitrable dispute lies within the ambit of the Arbitration Act, a district
court has the discretion to enter an injunction to maintain the status quo
pending arbitration when, without an injunction, the arbitral process would
become a hollow formality.5 7 In light of its holding, the Fourth Circuit also
specifically rejected Bradley's distinction that preliminary injunctions are
necessary to effectuate congressional policy favoring arbitration in labor
cases but not in commercial cases."
After deciding that the Arbitration Act does not bar a federal district
court from entering a preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit examined
whether the district court had abused its discretion by granting a preliminary
injunction.

9

To determine whether a district court has abused its discretion

by granting a temporary injunction in cases under the Arbitration Act, the
Fourth Circuit applies a balance of hardship test.6° Under the balance of
hardship test, a court must first determine whether the potential harm to the
plaintiff absent an injunction outweighs the potential harm to the defendant
stemming from the issuance of an injunction. 61 Next, a court must ascertain
56. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054.
57. Id. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the hollow formality test used by the Fourth Circuit in labor cases involving § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to determine when a federal district court may enter an injunction
maintaining the status quo under § 3 of the Arbitration Act. Id. The hollow formality test
provides that a federal district court may enter a preliminary injunction to preserve the status
quo pending arbitration when, absent an injunction, the arbitral process could not return the
parties substantially to the status quo ante. Id. (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem.
Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976)). To grant an injunction properly
a court must still apply the balance of hardship test. See infra note 61 and accompanying text
(discussing balance of hardship test). When an arbitral award cannot return the parties to the
status quo ante, the Fourth Circuit in Bradley defined the arbitration as a "hollow formality."
Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053-54. Implicit in the Fourth Circuit's hollow formality test is that cases
under the Arbitration Act will satisfy the hollow formality test whenever a plaintiff faces
irreparable harm because arbitration can never return an irreparably harmed plaintiff to the
status quo ante. See id. at 1053-54 (defining arbitration as hollow formality when arbitral award
cannot return parties substantially to status quo ante).
58. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053.
59. Id. at 1054.
60. Id.; see infra note 61 (discussing balance of hardship test to determine when district
courts abuse discretion by granting temporary injunction in cases subject to Arbitration Act).
61. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054-55; see Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550
F.2d 189, 193-96 (4th Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig
Mfg. Co. defined the balance of hardship test to determine when a court can properly issue a
preliminary injunction under FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a). Id. Under the balance of hardship test, a
district court must consider the following four elements: 1) likelihood of irreparable harm to
plaintiff in absence of an injunction; 2) likelihood of harm to defendant caused by an injunction;
3) likelihood of plaintiff's success on the merits; and 4) public interest in granting an injunction.
Id. The most important elements, according to the Blackwelder court, are the probability of
irreparable harm to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction and the potential for harm to
the defendant by granting the injunction. Id. If a court finds that the probability of irreparable
harm to the plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to the defendant, then the court need not
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whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his case and whether
an injunction will serve the public interest. 62 The Fourth Circuit stated that
when the danger of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in the absence of an
injunction is greater than the potential harm to the defendant, a district
court implicitly determines that the arbitral process will be a "hollow
63
formality" without an injunction.
When the Fourth Circuit applied the balance of hardship test to the
district court's decision to grant Merrill Lynch a preliminary injunction, the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 6" The
Bradley court found that the potential harm to Merrill Lynch outweighed any
potential harm to Bradley because after Merrill Lynch's clients have transferred their accounts to Prudential-Bache, the extent of Merrill Lynch's
damages would be indeterminable." Recognizing the inability to assess damages
as a form of irreparable harm, the Bradley court determined that the failure
to grant an injunction would render the arbitral process a hollow formality."6
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit found that Bradley had failed to show that
a preliminary injunction, pending expedited arbitration, would cause Bradley
any harm.67
Whether the Arbitration Act divests the federal district courts of the
power to grant a temporary injunction pending arbitration has divided the
federal circuit courts. 6s The Second and Seventh Circuits have decided that
find a probability of success on the merits, but may enter an injunction on a finding that the
case presents grave and serious issues for litigation. Id. Accord North Carolina State Ports
Auth. v. Dart Containerline Co., 592 F.2d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 1979) (most important elements
of balance of hardship test are probability of irreparable injury to plaintiff in absence of
injunction and potential harm to defendant by issuing injunction).
62. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054-55; see supra note 61 (discussing elements of balance of
hardship test for determining when federal district court abused its discretion by granting a
preliminary injunction).
63. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054-55. In Bradley, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion by granting a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo
because the district court found that Merrill Lynch faced irreparable harm through the
noncompensable loss of customers. Id. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit found that the district
court had determined implicitly that arbitration of the dispute in Bradley would be a "hollow
formality" absent an injunction. Id. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing
elements of balance of hardship test for determining when federal district court abused its discretion by granting preliminary injunction).
64. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1055. The Fourth Circuit in Bradley held that the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia properly had found that the balance
of hardship favored Merrill Lynch. Id. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district
court implicitly had found that the arbitration would have been a hollow formality in the
absence of a preliminary injunction. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court
properly had granted Merrill Lynch's request for a preliminary injunction. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 105 S. Ct. 811, 813
(1985) (question of whether Arbitration Act bars courts from issuing temporary injunction
pending arbitration is causing split in federal courts); infra note 71 and accompanying text
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federal district courts may enter temporary injunctions to maintain the status
quo when the parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes.6 9 The Eighth and
(examples of federal courts' division concerning question of whether Arbitration Act allows
courts to grant status quo injunctions).
69. See Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984); Connecticut Res. Recovery Auth. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 705 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1983); Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
613 F.2d 468, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1980). In Sauer-GetriebeKG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., the White
Hydraulics, Inc. (White), entered into a contract with Sauer-Getriebe KG (Sauer) to give Sauer
the exclusive right to sell motors manufactured by White. Sauer-Getriebe,715 F.2d at 349. White
also agreed to give Sauer certain trade secrets, patents and other rights necessary for the manufacturing of motors. Id. The parties agreed to settle all disputes arising out of the contract by arbitration. Id. Sauer filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, alleging that White had repudiated the contract. Id. Sauer sought injunctive relief to
bar White from selling any manufacturing rights until the parties completed arbitration.
Id. at 348. The district court denied Sauer's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Id. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enjoin
White from transferring any of Sauer's alleged contractual rights. Id. at 352. The Seventh
Circuit held that although a court cannot decide a contractual dispute relegated to arbitration,
Sauer had demonstrated a probable success on the merits, and, therefore, was entitled to
injunctive relief to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted
that the injunction served the public interest because the injunction promoted the strong policy
favoring the arbitration of contractual disputes when the parties contractually agree to arbitrate
disputes. Id.
In Connecticut Resources Recovery Auth. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., the Second
Circuit held that in a case under the Arbitration Act, a court issuing a status quo injunction
must find the danger of irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law to grant properly an
injunction. Connecticut Resources Recovery Auth. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 705 F.2d
31, 35 (2d Cir. 1983).
In Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., Guinness-Harp Corporation
(Guinness) sought an injunction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York .to enjoin Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company (Schlitz) from terminating Guinness'
distributorship. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 470-71 (2d
Cir. 1980). Guinness argued that pursuant to the distributorship agreement, Schlitz could not
terminate the distributorship until Schlitz completed certain procedures, which included arbitration. Id. at 470. The agreement also provided for maintaining the status quo pending the
outcome of the arbitration. Id. Affirming the district court's decision to grant an injunction
enforcing the status quo provision pending arbitration, the Second Circuit held the injunction
was proper under two theories. Id. at 472. First, under the Arbitration Act, a court can decide
issues related to the making and performance of an agreement to arbitrate, and a court can
grant specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate. Id. The Second Circuit reasoned that
the agreement to maintain the status quo substantially related to the performance of the
agreement to arbitrate because presumably Guinness agreed to arbitrate disputes on the condition
that the parties would maintain the status quo pending arbitration. Id.
Under its second theory, the Guinness-Harp court noted that whether the promise to
maintain the status quo was merely a condition precedent or consideration for the arbitration
agreement, the status quo injunction was still proper. Id. The Second Circuit held that the
"plain meaning" of the contract provided that the status quo should continue pending
arbitration and that the arbitration provision did not bar the district court from enforcing the
plain meaning of a contract. Id. Circuits other than the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits do not appear to have addressed the issue of whether § 3 of the Arbitration Act,
requiring a court to stay a trial, absolutely precludes a district court from entering a status quo
injunction pending arbitration.
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Tenth Circuits, however, have held that section 3 of the Arbitration Act,
commanding a court to stay the trial, requires a stay of all judicial action
and therefore divests federal district courts of the power to grant temporary
injunctions. 70 Furthermore, the issue of whether section 3 of the Arbitration

70. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1291 (8th
Cir. 1984); Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1051 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Scott, No. 83-1480 (10th Cir. May 12, 1983) (unpublished opinion)). In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, Ivan Hovey was an account executive with Merrill Lynch and
signed an agreement providing that upon termination of Hovey's employment with Merrill
Lynch, all client lists would remain the property of Merrill Lynch and that Hovey would not
solicit any of Merrill Lynch's customers. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1287. Hovey left Merrill Lynch to
work for E.F. Hutton. Id. Hovey admitted retaining information concerning certain Merrill
Lynch clients and soliciting Merrill Lynch customers while at E.F. Hutton. Id. at 1287-88.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota's
decision to grant Merrill Lynch injunctive relief. Id. at 1292. The Hovey court held that when
the Arbitration Act applies to a dispute, the language of § 3 directs that a court must stay any
judicial action. Id. at 1291.
The Hovey court's reasoning to support its refusal to grant injunctive relief consisted of
two elements. Id. at 1292. First, the Hovey court reasoned that to issue an injunction a court
must examine the merits of a dispute, and according to the Hovey court an inquiry into the
plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of the case unnecessarily injects a court into the
merits of the dispute. Id. The Hovey court noted that the arbitrators should examine the merits
of the case. Id.
The Hovey court relied on Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. for the
proposition that the merits of a case are better left to the arbitrators. Id.; see Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967). In Prima Paint, however,
the United States Supreme Court held that the question of fraud in the inducement of a contract
containing an arbitration clause is an arbitrable issue under the agreement which the arbitrators
should decide, and the Prima Paint Court never addressed the issue of whether § 3 of the
Arbitration Act, mandating that courts must stay a trial pending arbitration, absolutely precludes
a federal district court from examining the merits of a case to grant a status quo injunction
pending arbitration. Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 403-04. Second, the Hovey court relied on Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO in which the United States Supreme Court
refused to enjoin a strike pending arbitration. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1292; see Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397, 412 (1976). In Buffalo Forge, the
United States Supreme Court held that judicial interference at the preliminary stages of a
dispute would eviscerate the intent of arbitration agreements. Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 412.
The Eighth Circuit's reliance on Buffalo Forge, however, was misplaced because the Buffalo
Forge case dealt with a strike that did not arise in response to an arbitrable dispute. Id.
Because the Eighth Circuit in Hovey found that the dispute between Merrill Lynch and
Hovey was arbitrable, the Eight Circuit should have relied on Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks
Union in which the United States Supreme Court dealt with a strike arising out of an arbitrable
dispute under a collective bargaining agreement. See Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U.S. 235, 254 (1970); Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1291-92. In the Boys Markets case, the Supreme
Court held that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which limits the jurisdiction of federal district
courts to enjoin striking unions, is not a bar to preliminary injunctive relief when a union
voluntarily undertakes a contractual agreement not to strike in return for an employer's
agreement to arbitrate disputes. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. The Boys Markets Court held
that when a court finds that both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate a dispute, the
court may issue an injunction if the court also requires an employer to arbitrate the dispute as
a condition of receiving injunctive relief. Id.; see infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing
holding in Boys Markets).
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Act bars a court from issuing an injunction has divided federal district
courts.7 ' The Bradley court's decision to permit status quo injunctions when
necessary to sustain arbitration as a meaningful alternative to litigation
represents a sound construction of the Arbitration Act and properly reflects
the use of federal courts to promote the strong congressional policy in favor
72
of arbitration expressed in the Arbitration Act.
Because section 3 of the Arbitration Act does not prohibit expressly
temporary injunctions, 7 the question of whether courts can enter injunctions
pending arbitration ultimately turns on whether Congress intended to deprive
the federal courts of their equitable jurisdiction.7 4 The United States Supreme

Finally, the Hovey court stated that the congressional intent underlying the Arbitration
Act to provide parties to an arbitration agreement with prompt arbitration compels the denial
of preliminary injunctive relief by federal district courts. Hovey, 726 F.2d at 1292. The Eighth
Circuit's reasoning, however, overlooks the more important policy of the Arbitration Act-to
enforce arbitration as an alternative to expensive litigation. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1924) (congressional intent underlying Arbitration Act is to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal courts). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is absurd in situations
like Hovey and Bradley, when absent an injunction, arbitration would become a meaningless
formality. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing when arbitration becomes
hollow formality). The congressional intent in enacting the Arbitration Act was to promote
arbitration as an alternative to expensive litigation, not to speed the parties into meaningless
arbitration. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act).
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Scott, the Tenth Circuit vacated in an
unpublished order a preliminary injunction pending arbitration of a breach of an arbitration
agreement. Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1051 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Scott, No. 83-1480 (10th Cir. May 12, 1983) (unpublished opinion)).
71. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. DeCaro, 577 F. Supp. 616,
624 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (court declined to grant status quo injunctions because allowing court to
consider merits as court must to decide whether to grant injunction is inconsistent with narrow
role assigned to courts under Arbitration Act and could improperly influence arbitrator's
decision); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shubert, 577 F. Supp. 406, 407 (M.D.
Fla. 1983) (same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Thompson, 575 F. Supp.
978, 979 (N.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that language of § 3 of Arbitration Act prohibits any
evidentiary proceedings required to issue status quo injunction because hearing detailed factual
issues would frustrate statutory policy of moving parties into arbitration as quickly as possible).
But see Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1294 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (§ 3 of Arbitration Act does not deprive court of power to enter status quo injunction;
rather, preliminary relief is particularly appropriate when in absence of preliminary relief
arbitration will be futile); Albatross S.S. Co. v. Manning Bros., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 459, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) (power to issue injunction pending arbitration follows from power to compel
arbitration); cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp. 246,
247-49 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (although court did not address issue of whether language of § 3 of
Arbitration Act bars federal district court from entering an injunction, court apparently assumed
court had power but denied injunction based on merits of case).
72. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054; supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy
of Arbitration Act).
73. See Federal Arbitration Act § 3, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982); supra note 5 and accompanying
text4quoting § 3 of Arbitration Act).
74. See Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288-291 (1960). The United States
Supreme Court noted in Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., that only "a clear and valid legislative
command" can limit the equitable jurisdiction of courts to secure complete justice. Id. The
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Court has held in Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc. 2S that unless a statute
demonstrates clear legislative intent to limit the courts' equitable powers,76
federal district courts retain their equitable jurisdiction to procure justice.
The Mitchell Court held that the federal courts retain their inherent equitable
powers unless a statute creates the inescapable inference that Congress
intended to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction. 77 The Mitchell court also
noted that doubtful statutory constructions should not limit the federal district
courts' inherent equitable powers. 7 The language of section 3 of the Arbi-

tration Act, requiring a stay of trial, does not indicate necessarily that
Congress meant to limit the courts' equitable power to grant preliminary
injunctive relief. 79 In contrast to section 3's ambiguous command to stay a
"trial," Congress has demonstrated its clear intent to deprive federal district
courts of equitable jurisdiction in other circumstances. 0 Because Congress
did not limit expressly the judiciary's equitable powers in section 3 of the
Arbitration Act, courts must assume that Congress did not intend to divest
federal courts of the power to grant temporary injunctions pending arbitration."'
Supreme Court has recognized that federal district courts have inherent jurisdiction to carry
out the legislative policy underlying federal statutes. Id. Congress can limit the federal courts'
power to hear certain cases or to grant certain equitable remedies. Id. A federal district court
presumably has the equitable power to secure justice, unless a statute evinces an unmistakable
congressional intent to limit the federal district court's equitable jurisdiction. Id. The Federal
Arbitration Act, however, does not provide special jurisdictional prerequisites to satisfy the
federal courts' jurisdictional requirements. Id. Therefore, parties ordinarily must satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1332. 3 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 4:3, at 10 (Law ed.
1981); see 15 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (to meet requirements of § 1332, party must show actual
controversy between citizens of different states and amount in controversy exceeding $10,000).
75. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
76. Id. at 291 (citing Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1946)). In Mitchell v.
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., the United States Supreme Court considered whether in a suit brought by the
Secretary of Labor to enjoin violations of § 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act for
discriminatory discharge, § 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act restricts a district court from
ordering reimbursement for lost wages caused by a discriminatory discharge. Id. at 289. Section
17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that no court has the jurisdiction to order payment
of unpaid minimum wages to employees in an action brought by the Secretary of Labor. Fair
Labor Standards Act § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982). After examining the language of § 17 and
the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the United States Supreme Court held
that Congress did not intend that § 17 apply in discriminatory discharge cases. Mitchell, 361
U.S. at 294-95. Rather, Congress enacted § 17 to restrict backpay in minimum wage cases. Id.
As a result, the Supreme Court held that a district court has the jurisdiction to order an employer
to reimburse employees for losses caused by unlawful discharge. Id. at 296.
77. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (quoting § 3 of the Arbitration Act).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (providing that federal courts cannot grant injunctions
to stay state court proceedings unless act of Congress specifically grants such authority); 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) (protecting debtors who file in bankruptcy by proscribing all proceedings
-judicial, administrative, or otherwise-against debtors, consequently limiting courts' jurisdiction
to fashion equitable remedies against debtor).
81. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1054; supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing
construction of statutes that limit equitable powers of federal district courts).
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Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's statutory interpretation
of the anti-injunctive language in the Norris-LaGuardia Act in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 77082 is instructive in construing section
3 of the Arbitration Act.8 1 In Boys Markets, the employer and the union
entered into a written no-strike agreement, which provided that the parties
would decide all disputes by binding arbitration and that the union would
not engage in any work stoppages because of disagreements concerning the
contract. The union, however, called a strike in violation of the agreement,
and the United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted the employer's motion for a temporary injunction. 5 In reversing the
Ninth Circuit's subsequent order vacating injunctive relief, 6 the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson,8 7 prohibiting courts from granting injunctions
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, frustrated the congressional policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes.8 8 Therefore, in the Court's view, a strict
82. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
83. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970). In Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, the United States Supreme Court held that an interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia is anti-injunction language, which prohibits enjoining strikes
arising from disputes that the parties have agreed to arbitrate, undermines the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that Congress enacted
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in part to correct a problem perceived by Congress that judges were
enjoining strikes according to the social views of the particular judge hearing the case. Id. at
253 n.22. The Supreme Court noted that a primary goal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to
promote the growth of labor organizations. Id. Absent a contractual agreement not to strike,
Congress intended to protect the union's freedom to strike to gain a better position in collective
bargaining. Id. The Supreme Court found that enforcing contractual agreements not to strike,
freely undertaken by the unions in collective bargaining, differed from enjoining strikes in labor
disputes absent the contractual agreement not to strike. Id. The Supreme Court held that
enforcing contractual agreements not to strike does not injure labor organizations, but enhances
the goal of promoting labor organizations by enforcing the obligations of the parties. Id.; see
also Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71 v. Akers
Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978) (language of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibiting injunctions must yield to congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes when in absence of injunction arbitration is proforma); Lever Bros. Co. v. International
Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976) (preliminary injunction proper to
prevent arbitration from becoming meaningless formality).
84. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 238-39.
85. Id.
86. Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 416 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1969).
87. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
88. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252; see Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
203 (1962), overruled by, Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970). In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, the Sinclair Refining Company (Company) filed
suit, seeking an injunction to prevent the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International
Union (Union) from striking or engaging in work slowdowns. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 198. The
Union filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because the dispute grew out of a "labor dispute"
as defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter an
injunction under § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 198. See Norris-LaGuardia Act §
4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982). The United States Supreme Court held that § 4(a) deprives federal
courts of jurisdiction to enter injunctions, regardless of whether the strike was in violation of
a contractual agreement. Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 198.
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interpretation of the anti-injunctive language in section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, that no court has the jurisdiction to enter an injunction,
must yield to the important congressional policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes.8 9 The Supreme Court decided in Boys Markets that if injunctive
protection is not available to employers, employers would not agree to
arbitrate disputes when such employers would be unable to enforce the
unions' agreements not to strike through injunctive relief. 9° Similarly, if by
entering arbitration agreements brokerage firms lose the right to enforce the
status quo pending arbitration, brokerage firms will lose the incentive to
enter arbitration agreements. Therefore, a narrow reading of the Arbitration
Act, limiting a court's power to enter status quo injunctions pending arbitration, offends the strong congressional policy favoring arbitration. 91
The Fourth Circuit's hollow formality test reflects a sound procedure to
effectuate the Arbitration Act's congressional policy to promote arbitration
and to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute into arbitration as quickly
as possible. 92 The hollow formality test allows federal district courts to
enter preliminary injunctions, regardless of whether the parties specifically
have agreed in the contract to maintain the status quo, when arbitration
would be unable to return the parties to the status quo ante.93 Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit's approach promotes arbitration by preserving the status
quo to ensure that arbitration remains an effective alternative for dispute
resolution. The Fourth Circuit has recognized in Bradley that the congressional intent underlying the Arbitration Act was not to allow one party to
abuse arbitration agreements by causing irreparable damage to the other
party pending arbitration. 94 When Congress announced a strong policy
favoring arbitration, Congress did not intend the Arbitration Act to promote
such abuses without recourse to the courts. 9 Rather, when parties agree to
submit disputes to arbitration, courts should be able to preserve the parties'
rights pending arbitration to allow arbitrators ultimately to decide the parties'
disputes on the merits.
DANIEL

J.

FETTERmAN

89. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 235. In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court found that
unavailability of equitable relief was a serious impediment toward implementing the congressional
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Id.
90. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. The Boys Markets Court reasoned that, without
injunctive relief, employers would lose the principle and most expeditious method to enforce
no-strike agreements. Id.
91. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act).
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act).
93. See Bradley, 756 F.2d at 1053-54; supra note 57 (discussing Fourth Circuit's adoption
of hollow formality test in labor cases).
94. See Brief for Appellee at 12-13, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that congressional intent of Arbitration Act was
not to allow one party to irreparably harm another party pending arbitration).
95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing policy of Arbitration Act to
enforce arbitration agreements and promote quick arbitration of disputes).

